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 We show how public knowledge about punishment institutions can affect their evolution.
 Subjects can establish a punishment institution before they play a public goods game.
 The evolutionary dynamics leads to a coexistence of pool punishers and opportunists.
 Pool punishment can evolve without second-order punishment and without loners.
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a b s t r a c t
In many species, mutual cooperation is stabilized by forms of policing and peer punishment: if cheaters
are punished, there is a strong selective pressure to cooperate. Most human societies have comple-
mented, and sometimes even replaced, such peer punishment mechanisms with pool punishment,
where punishment is outsourced to central institutions such as the police. Even before free-riding
occurs, such institutions require investments, which could serve as costly signals. Here, we show with a
game theoretical model that this signaling effect in turn can be crucial for the evolution of punishment
institutions: In the absence of such signals, pool punishment is only stable with second-order
punishment and can only evolve when individuals have the freedom not to take part in any interaction.
With such signals, individuals can opportunistically adjust their behavior, which promotes the evolution
of stable pool punishment even in situations where no one can stand aside. Thus, the human propensity
to react opportunistically to credible punishment threats is often sufﬁcient to establish stable punish-
ment institutions and to maintain high levels of cooperation.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
1. Introduction
When individuals share common resources, or when they
engage in mutualistic relationships, they may be tempted to reap
the beneﬁts without paying the associated costs (Hardin, 1968;
Trivers, 1971). Stable cooperation thus requires mechanisms that
suppress selﬁsh behavior (Nowak, 2006; Sigmund, 2010). One
such mechanism is punishment: various biological examples
suggest that sanctions can create a sufﬁciently strong selective
pressure to prevent cheating (Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995;
Sigmund, 2007). Sanctions can take different forms, such as the
selective abortion of overexploited ﬂowers in plant–pollinator
mutualisms (Goto et al., 2010), or the chasing of cheating cleaner
ﬁshes (Bshary and Grutter, 2005). In human societies, sanctions
may range from merely symbolic acts or monetary ﬁnes, to
imprisonment and the exclusion of individuals from the commu-
nity (Guala, 2012; Sasaki and Uchida, 2013). In all these instances,
punishment is thought to prevent cheating as it creates additional
incentives for individuals to cooperate.
From a theoretical viewpoint, there are two different ways to
implement a punishment regime (Sigmund et al., 2010). One way
is to rely on decentralized sanctions, such that cheaters are directly
punished by their victims or by present third parties (e.g. Raihani
et al., 2010). Several models have shown how such a system of
peer punishment can evolve due to the effects of group selection
(Boyd et al., 2003), optional participation (Fowler, 2005; Hauert et
al., 2007, 2008; De Silva et al., 2010), local interactions (Nakamaru
and Iwasa, 2006; Helbing et al., 2010a,b), and coordination
(Boyd et al., 2010). However, especially for humans, the effect of
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decentralized sanctions on overall welfare remains disputed, as
the use of punishment may actually decrease the overall welfare
(Dreber et al., 2008; Gächter et al., 2008). Moreover, several
studies have revealed detrimental sides of peer punishment, as it
may provoke anti-social punishment (Herrmann et al., 2008; Rand
and Nowak, 2011; Powers et al., 2012), or counter-punishment
(Nikiforakis, 2008; Janssen and Bushman, 2008; Fehl et al., 2012).
Although these problems can be circumvented when individuals
have the option to abstain from the public good such that they
cannot be punished (García and Traulsen, 2012), or when the
individuals' reputation is at stake (Sigmund et al., 2001; Hilbe and
Sigmund, 2010; dos Santos et al., 2011; Hilbe and Traulsen, 2012),
peer punishment is often considered as a form of self-justice,
which is not desirable as it can be misused.
In view of these shortcomings, many human societies have
delegated the prosecution of wrong-doers to central sanctioning
institutions (Sigmund et al., 2010, 2011; Baldassari and Grossman,
2011; Sasaki et al., 2012; Cressman et al., 2012; Perc, 2012;
Traulsen et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2013; Hilbe et al., 2014).
Maintaining such pool punishment institutions is costly and
requires ﬁnancial contributions in the form of taxes and fees,
ideally paid by all beneﬁciaries. Such a regime has the apparent
disadvantage that the costs of pool-punishment arise even when
there are no exploiters to punish (Sigmund et al., 2010, 2011).
However, as we show here, this does not necessarily imply that
taxes were wasted. When sanctioning institutions are publicly
visible, they act as a costly signal. Their mere existence may be the
reason why there were no exploiters to punish in the ﬁrst place
(and conversely, this deterrent effect of sanctioning institutions
may be the major incentive to make the institutions publicly
visible).
In the following, we present a model that makes this signaling
effect of sanctioning institutions explicit, based on the public
goods game (PGG) by Sigmund et al. (2010). In our model, which
is formally introduced in Section 2, individuals can condition their
behavior in the PGG on whether or not a punishment institution
has been established. This extended model gives rise to new
opportunistic behaviors: individuals may decide to cooperate in
the PGG only if they would be punished otherwise. We show in
Section 3 that the possibility of opportunism facilitates the
evolution of pool punishment systems even when participation
in the PGG is mandatory, and even when tax evaders are not
punished, i.e. in the absence of second-order punishment. This
implies that in contrast to previous work (Sigmund et al., 2010;
Traulsen et al., 2012), second-order punishment is not required for
the stability of the punishment institution if the institution's
existence is known before the public goods game takes place.
Thus, our model considerably extends the range of application of
pool punishment institutions, as compared to the original model
by Sigmund et al. (2010). Without second-order punishment,
however, tax evasion remains a persistent phenomenon. Evolution
settles at a mixed equilibrium in which a majority of individuals
cooperate in the PGG, whereas only a minority pays taxes for the
punishment institution.
In Section 4 we discuss the robustness of our results by
considering four different model extensions. With the ﬁrst two
extensions, diminishing taxes and second-order punishment, we
explore two different mechanisms that aim to reduce tax evasion.
Only the second model extension will turn out to be an effective
means to eradicate tax evasion completely. In the third model
extension we explore the impact of incomplete information. When
punishment institutions are not perfectly visible, opportunists
may fail to adapt, which in turn reduces the institution's efﬁciency.
Nevertheless, we will show that perfect information is not
necessary for stable pool punishment to evolve. The last model
extension then explores the impact of different punishment
technologies. In Section 5, we discuss these ﬁndings and compare
our results to previous literature on institution formation.
2. Baseline model
2.1. Setup of the public goods game
We consider a PGG between n players and with three stages.
In the ﬁrst stage, all individuals decide whether to participate in
the game or not. Non-participants, the so-called loners, do not
have to take any other decision and get a small, but secure payoff
s40, which is independent of the decisions of the other players
(Hauert et al., 2002a,b). In the second stage, participants choose
whether or not to pay taxes, i.e., whether to pay an amount γ40
for the punishment institution. In the last stage of the game,
participants are informed on the establishment of the punishment
institution and they can choose whether to contribute an amount
c40 to the public good. Contributions are multiplied by a factor
r41, and equally shared among all other participants (i.e., con-
tributions can be considered as purely altruistic, as individuals do
not beneﬁt from their own contributions. This variant of the public
goods game is sometimes referred to as “mutual aid game”, see
e.g. De Silva et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2013; Sasaki, 2013).
Moreover, if at least one player paid taxes for the punishment
institution, then all non-contributors have to pay a ﬁne β. Later, we
will relax this assumption and consider situations where more tax
payers lead to a more severe punishment. In order for the model to
be interesting, we suppose that β4c (such that punishment ﬁnes
act as a deterrent) and that sorccγ (such that a society where
everyone pays taxes and contributes to the public good is superior
to a society where subjects simply abstain from collective action).
As the main difference to the pool punishment model of
Sigmund et al. (2010), we assume that participants know whether
a punishment institution has been established before they are
asked to contribute to the public good. Thus, in addition to the
previously considered set of strategies, consisting of loners L (who
abstain from the PGG), defectors D (who neither pay taxes nor
contribute to the public good), cooperators C (who contribute to
the public good, but do not pay taxes), and pool punishers P (who
both pay taxes and contribute to the common pool), we also
allow for opportunists O. Opportunists do not pay taxes, and
they contribute to the public good only if there is a punishment
institution.
Note that there are two additional possible types: anti-
opportunists A (who do not pay taxes and only contribute to the
public pool if no punishment institution has been established) and
self-defeating players S (who pay taxes but fail to contribute to the
public good). These two behaviors are somewhat paradoxical, and
one can easily show that evolutionary processes lead to their
extinction if selection pressure is sufﬁciently strong. For the sake
of simplicity, we will thus neglect these two strategies in the
following (our main results remain essentially unchanged if we
considered the complete strategy space instead – only if selection
is weak, all available strategies would be present).
2.2. Population setup and evolutionary dynamics
To model the evolutionary dynamics of strategies over time,
we suppose that the above PGG is played in a population of ﬁnite
size N. Let NL, ND, NC, NP and NO denote respectively the number of
loners, defectors, cooperators, pool punishers and opportunists in
the population, such that NLþNDþNCþNPþNO ¼N. We assume
that groups for the PGG are formed randomly, by drawing n
individuals from the population without replacement. In that case,
the expected payoff πi for each strategy iAfL;C;D; P;Og can be
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computed by averaging over all possible group compositions
obtained by multivariate hypergeometric sampling (see Appen-
dix). The resulting payoffs become
πL ¼ s
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To interpret these payoffs, let us take the payoff of a defector πD as
an example. The ﬁrst expression on the right-hand side corre-
sponds to the case of a group where all n1 co-players of the
defector are loners, such that no public goods game takes place
and the defector obtains the loner's payoff s automatically. The
second term then gives the expected payoff when the defector
plays the PGG, assuming that there is at least one pool punisher
among the co-players. In that case, the defector obtains an
expected beneﬁt rcðNNLNDÞ=ðNNL1Þ, but in return has to
pay a ﬁne β due to the presence of the punishment institution. The
last expression on the right-hand side is a correction term that
accounts for the fact that there does not need to be a pool
punisher among the defector's co-players. In that case, the
defector saves the punishment ﬁne β, but his expected beneﬁt
from the PGG is reduced by rcNO=ðNNLNP1Þ due to the
presence of opportunists who do not contribute in this case.
Similar interpretations can be given for the other payoff values.
The frequency of each strategy in the population may change over
time, depending on the strategy's relative success. To model such an
evolutionary dynamics where successful strategies spread within the
population, we employ a pairwise comparison process (Blume, 1993;
Szabó and Tőke, 1998; Traulsen et al., 2006). That is, we assume that
in each time step two players with strategies i and j are picked at
random from the population. Depending on the payoffs of the two
players, the i-player adopts strategy j with probability:
pij ¼
1
1þexp½sðπjπiÞ
: ð2Þ
The parameter sZ0 is called the strength of selection. In the limit of
weak selection, s-0, the probability pij approaches 1/2 independent
of the payoffs, such that imitation occurs essentially at random. In the
limit of strong selection, s-1, on the other hand, players only
imitate their co-players if the co-player yielded a higher payoff.
In addition to these social learning events, we allow for random
strategy exploration (corresponding to mutations in genetic
models). That is, we assume that in each time step, one player
may switch to another strategy with probability μ40 (with all
other strategies having equal chance to be chosen). Overall, these
assumptions imply that the change of strategies over time follows
an ergodic stochastic process. When mutations are sufﬁciently
rare, this process can be approximated by considering the transi-
tions between homogeneous populations only (Fudenberg and
Imhof, 2006; Wu et al., 2012).
3. Results
3.1. Static analysis
To obtain an intuitive understanding of the dynamics of the
model, let us start by analyzing the evolutionary stable states (ESS)
of the system; that is, we calculate the stable strategy mixtures
such that no absent mutant strategy can invade (Maynard Smith
and Price, 1973; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998).
As our ﬁrst step, we note that there is no ESS in pure strategies.
Among loners, cooperators, and defectors there is an evolutionary
rock-scissors-paper cycle, with defectors invading cooperators,
loners invading defectors, and cooperators invading loners
(Hauert et al., 2002a, 2002b; Semmann et al., 2003), see also
Fig. 1. A similar cycle characterizes the dynamics among loners,
cooperators, opportunists, as the latter always act as defectors in
the absence of the threat of punishment. As a consequence, if only
defectors and opportunists are present in the population, the
dynamics is governed by neutral drift. Between defectors and pool
punishers there is a bistable competition, with none of the two
strategies being able to invade the other given sufﬁciently large N
and that β4cþγ. Nevertheless, a monomorphic population of
pool punishers can always be invaded by cooperators, as coopera-
tors save the costs for the punishment authority (i.e., cooperators
are secondorder free riders, Sigmund et al., 2010). Thus, no pure
ESS exists.
Fig. 1. Schematic illustration of the possible transitions between homogeneous
populations. Each colored circle corresponds to a homogeneous state where all
members of the population play the same strategy. Black circles depict mixed
equilibria between two pure strategies, and these circles are ﬁlled if the equili-
brium is evolutionarily stable. Arrows describe the evolutionary transitions of the
evolutionary process in the limit of rare mutations and strong selection (Fudenberg
et al., 2006), with dashed lines denoting neutral drift. The graph indicates that
there is no pure ESS, but there is a mixed ESS in which opportunists coexist with
pool punishers. This ESS can be reached from any other initial population by
following an appropriate transition path. For this illustration, we have assumed
that β4γþc, such that a population of pool punishers is stable against invasion by
defectors.
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Interestingly, however, there is an evolutionarily stable mixture
of pool punishers and opportunists. Indeed, a single opportunist in
a population of pool punishers acts like a cooperator, and thus can
invade as a second-order free rider. Conversely, a single pool
punisher in a population of opportunists is able to induce full
cooperationwithin his group, whereas groups of opportunists only
end up with a payoff of zero. To calculate the equilibrium point
between opportunists and pool punishers, we set NL ¼NC ¼
ND ¼ 0 in Eq. (1). Then the condition πP ¼ πO leads to
rccγ ¼ rcc
NO1
n1
 
N1
n1
  ðrccÞ ð3Þ
For sufﬁciently large population sizes N, we can make use of the
approximation
NO1
n1
 
N1
n1
   xn1O
where xO ¼NO=N denotes the fraction of opportunists in the
population. Thus, for large populations the equilibrium fraction
of opportunists according to condition (3) is approximately
given by
x^O ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
γ
rcc
n 1
r
: ð4Þ
As 0orccγ, this value of x^O is always in the unit interval. The
average payoff in this equilibrium is rccγ (which coincides
with the payoff of a homogeneous population of pool punishers).
The payoff of the opportunists is reduced to this quantity as they
often end up in groups where no one is willing to punish and thus
no one cooperates.
One can easily show that this mixture of opportunists and pool
punishers cannot be invaded by any of the three absent strategies
L, C, or D: Loners cannot invade since sorccγ. Cooperators
and defectors cannot invade because Eq. (1) implies that both
strategies are weakly dominated by the opportunistic strategy (i.e.
πCrπO and πDrπO for all possible population mixtures; for
0o x^Oo1 both inequalities are strict in sufﬁciently large popula-
tions). With a similar argument, one can also show that the game
has no other ESS. Moreover, this unique ESS can be reached from
any given initial population (see Fig. 1).
Thus our static analysis predicts that for sufﬁciently strong
selection, evolutionary dynamics will lead to a stable coexistence
of pool punishers and opportunists. According to Eq. (4), the
equilibrium fraction of opportunists increases with the tax amount
γ and with group size n, and it decreases with the net beneﬁt of
the public good, rc-c.
3.2. Numerical simulations
In order to conﬁrm these analytical predictions and to explore
other intensities of selection, we have run individual-based simu-
lations of the evolutionary process as described in Section 2.2.
Assuming rare mutations, we ﬁnd two different dynamical regimes
(see Fig. 2). When selection is weak (s¼0.01), and payoffs only play
a subordinate role for evolutionary success, no strategy is able to
get the upper hand. Instead, there are endless cycles that lead from
one homogeneous population to another homogeneous popula-
tion. In this regime, loners are most abundant, as a population of
loners is most robust against invasion by other strategies: leaving a
population of loners requires not only a mutant that switches to
cooperation or pool punishment, but also this single mutant is the
only participant of the game and acts as a loner. Only if the single
mutant successfully reproduces (which happens with probability
1/2), it can take over the population. For all other homogeneous
populations, one appropriate mutant is immediately advantageous
and can lead the population away from the corresponding state
(for example, one single defector is advantageous in a population of
cooperators).
For strong selection (s¼100) the qualitative behavior is clearly
different: the population almost immediately converges to a stable
mixture of opportunists and pool punishers. The position of this
stable mixture is accurately predicted by Eq. (4): for the para-
meters of the simulation the stable fraction of opportunists
becomes x^O ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
0:7=24
p
 0:77. Thus, only a minority of players pays
taxes in this equilibrium. However, this is still sufﬁcient to reach a
substantial amount of cooperation in the PGG: the probability that
all players of a randomly formed group contribute to the public
good is given by 1 x^nO  0:73, and the payoff in this equilibrium is
rccγ ¼ 1:3. Thus, publicly visible sanctioning institutions are
able to induce a satisfactory level of cooperation, despite a
substantial amount of second-order free riders in the population.
To ﬁnd the critical selection intensity that separates the weak
selection regime from the strong selection regime, we have run
extensive simulations for a broad range of selection strengths.
As depicted by Fig. 3, the weak selection regime can be found for
selection strengths sr0:1. For this parameter range, the long-run
abundance of strategies can be reasonably predicted by the rare-
mutation limit, which approximates the dynamics by only con-
sidering the Markov chain for transitions among the ﬁve homo-
geneous populations (Fudenberg and Imhof, 2006; Wu et al.,
2012). As the selection strength exceeds s 1, however, the
long-run abundance of strategies is determined by the position
of the ESS. In this regime, payoff differences have a sufﬁcient
impact on imitation for opportunists and pool punishers to be
stable against invasion of other types.
3.3. Interpretation
For a better understanding of the importance of the signaling
effect of institutions on the emergence of pool punishment, let us
Fig. 2. Evolutionary dynamics for two different selection regimes. Each graph
shows a representative simulation run for the case of weak selection (upper graph)
and strong selection (lower graph), respectively. For both runs, mutations are
sufﬁciently rare such that mutants typically take over the whole population or go
extinct before the next mutation arises. While the weak selection regime exhibits a
strong oscillatory behavior, the strong selection regime leads to a stable coexistence
of opportunists and pool punishers. Parameters: N¼100, n¼5, c¼1, r¼3, γ¼0.7,
β¼1.5, s¼1 and μ¼0.001.
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compare these ﬁndings with the results when such an effect is
absent (Sigmund et al., 2010). If the signaling effect is absent,
opportunism is not a possible behavior any longer, and the feasible
strategy set consists of cooperators, defectors, loners and pool
punishers only.
In Fig. 4, we show the frequency of strategies in the strong
selection limit, depending on whether or not opportunism is
feasible, and depending on whether or not abstaining from the
public good is feasible. If neither option is feasible, evolution leads
to a homogeneous population of free riders with payoff zero. The
inclusion of an outside option, by adding loners to the population,
can partly resolve the problem: in the new steady state, the
strategies L, D, C, and P are played in proportions 2:2:2:1
(Sigmund et al., 2010, 2011). For the parameters used in the
previous simulations, this implies that the long-run average payoff
is approximately given by ð2sþ3rc3cγÞ=7 1:07, which is
clearly better than the defector's payoff of zero. The outside option
thus improves the situation, because it provides an escape from
fully selﬁsh populations, without establishing stable cooperation,
however.
In contrast, when punishment institutions are implemented
such that they are visible for all community members, then a
substantial level of cooperation can be achieved even if there is no
outside option that helps to escape from defectors. Instead, a
homogeneous population of defectors can be subverted by oppor-
tunists, initially through neutral drift (see also Fig. 1) – the option
to abstain from the public goods interaction is no longer necessary
as an escape hatch out of mutual defection. Once opportunism is
common, such that a substantial fraction of the population can be
swayed by additional external incentives, pool punishers can
invade as they are able to transform non-cooperative co-players
into fully cooperative co-players. Thus, the signaling effect of
sanctioning institutions helps to overcome both problems, the
emergence of cooperation in a population of defectors, and the
continuous maintenance of a substantial level of cooperation
over time.
4. Model extensions
4.1. Diminishing taxes
In the previous analysis, paying taxes for a punishment institu-
tion shares the characteristics of a volunteer's dilemma: it takes
one volunteer who pays the taxes for a central institution that is
beneﬁcial for the whole group (Diekmann, 1985; Archetti and
Scheuring, 2012; Raihani and Bshary, 2011; Przepiorka and
Diekmann, 2013). However, this model has the maybe somewhat
unrealistic feature that the total costs of the punishment institu-
tion increase linearly with the number of tax payers; in a group
with k tax payers, the costs of the punishment institution are γk.
Seen from this angle, it is of little surprise that the model predicts
a considerable fraction of tax evaders: it would be inefﬁcient if
everyone paid taxes.
Instead, one may consider a model in which the total costs of a
punishment institution are ﬁxed to γ, and these costs are shared
among all tax-payers (Weesie and Franzen, 1998). Under this
assumption, individual taxes decrease with the number of tax
payers. In a group with k tax payers, each tax payer only has to pay
γ/k. Leaving everything else unchanged, one may speculate that
such diminishing taxes are able to raise the fraction of pool
punishers in the population, and that they suppress tax evasion.
It is relatively simple to incorporate diminishing taxes into our
model (for peer punishment systems in inﬁnitely large popula-
tions, this has been done by Dercole et al., 2013). Only the
Fig. 3. Long-run abundance of strategies for varying selection strength. Each point
shows the outcome of an individual-based simulation. Dashed lines represent the
analytical prediction based on the rare-mutation limit (Fudenberg and Imhof,
2006; Wu et al., 2012) which is only valid for weak selection in our case (as it
presumes that populations do not settle at mixed states). Solid lines depict the
prediction for strong selection based on the ESS of the system (Section 3.1). The
rare-mutation limit gives a reasonable approximation of the dynamics for so0:1,
whereas for s41, the system can be described by the ESS. Thus, for sufﬁciently
strong selection only pool punishers and opportunists are present in the popula-
tion; loners, defectors and cooperators are driven to extinction. To get a more
detailed picture of the behavior when 0:1oso1, we have run additional simula-
tions for this interval. Parameters are the same as in Fig. 2, and simulations were
run for 109 time steps.
Fig. 4. Effect of the option to abstain and the possibility of opportunism on the
evolution of pool punishment. Each graph shows the distribution of strategies in
the analytical limit of small mutation rates and strong selection. When opportu-
nism is possible (i.e. when institutions are publicly visible), then the option to
abstain is not necessary to establish a positive level of pool punishment, resulting
in high levels of cooperation. In the case without opportunism, the result is
parameter independent as long as the inequalities 0osorccγ and β4γþc are
satisﬁed (Sigmund et al., 2010, 2011). For the case with opportunism, we have used
the previous parameters (Fig. 2) to depict the evolutionarily stable mixture of
opportunists and pool punishers.
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expected payoff of a pool punisher needs to be replaced by
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One can interpret this modiﬁed payoff πP as follows: if NP is large,
then the expected number of punishers in the group is roughly
n  NP=N, and thus the expected individual tax is approximately
γ=ðnNP=NÞ. However, two corrections are necessary; one that
accounts for the fact that the group contains at least one punisher,
and the other for the fact that no tax needs to be paid when all
other players are loners.
To calculate the ESS of the modiﬁed system with diminishing
taxes, we proceed as in Section 3.1. For NL ¼ND ¼NC ¼ 0, the
condition πP ¼ πO is equivalent to
rcc γ
nNP=N
1
NNP
n
 
N
n
 
0
BBB@
1
CCCA¼ rcc
NO1
n1
 
N1
n1
  ðrccÞ: ð6Þ
In the limit of large population sizes, this equation becomes
rcc γ
nð1xOÞ
ð1xnOÞ ¼ ðrccÞ  ð1xn1O Þ: ð7Þ
This can be reduced to the equation f ðxOÞ ¼ 0, with
f ðxOÞ ¼ ðrccÞxn1O 
γ
n
ðxn1O þxn2O þ⋯þxOþ1Þ: ð8Þ
As this is a polynomial of degree n1, there is no analytical
expression for the equilibrium fraction of opportunists x^O. How-
ever, for the parameter values used before (see Fig. 2), one can
solve f ðxOÞ ¼ 0 numerically, yielding the unique real solution
within the unit interval x^O  0:65 (as compared to x^O ¼ 0:77 in
the equilibrium without diminishing taxes). The resulting average
payoff in the population is π^  1:65. Thus, diminishing taxes
indeed have the potential to reduce tax evasion, and to increase
average payoffs. Overall, however, tax evasion remains a persistent
phenomenon (xO¼0 is never an equilibrium as f ð0Þo0 for all
parameter values).
4.2. Second-order punishment
As another mechanism that may reduce tax evasion, let us
brieﬂy consider second-order punishment (in which case not only
non-contributors are punished, but additionally also tax-evaders).
Assuming that the penalty for each offense is β (such that non-
contributing tax evaders pay a ﬁne 2β), this leads to the following
modiﬁcation of the payoffs in Eq. (1):
πD ¼
NL
n1
 
N1
n1
 sþ 1
NL
n1
 
N1
n1
 
0
BBB@
1
CCCA rcNNLNDNNL1 2β
 

NNP1
n1
 
 NL
n1
 
N1
n1
  rc NO
NNLNP1
2β
 
πC ¼
NL
n1
 
N1
n1
 sþ 1
NL
n1
 
N1
n1
 
0
BBB@
1
CCCA rcNNLND1NNL1 cβ
 

NNP1
n1
 
 NL
n1
 
N1
n1
  rc NO
NNLNP1
β
 
πP ¼
NL
n1
 
N1
n1
 sþ 1
NL
n1
 
N1
n1
 
0
BBB@
1
CCCA rcNNLND1NNL1 cγ
 
πO ¼
NL
n1
 
N1
n1
 sþ 1
NL
n1
 
N1
n1
 
0
BBB@
1
CCCA rcNNLND1NNL1 cβ
 

NNP1
n1
 
 NL
n1
 
N1
n1
  rc NO1
NNLNP1
cβ
 
; ð9Þ
with the payoff for loners being unchanged, πL ¼s. Provided that
β4γ, it is straightforward to show that a homogeneous popula-
tion of pool punishers now is evolutionarily stable: in such a
population, the payoff of the residents is rccγ, whereas the
payoff of a single mutant is πD ¼ rc2β (if the mutant is a
defector), πC ¼ πO ¼ rccβ (if the mutant is a cooperator or an
opportunist), or πL ¼s (if the mutant is a loner); thus, our
assumptions β4c and sorccγ guarantee that all mutant
payoffs are below the payoff of the resident.
As in Sigmund et al. (2010), we arrive at the conclusion that
second-order punishment leads to the ﬁxation of pool punish-
ment. The mean payoff in such a population, however, is
π^ ¼ rccγ, which is exactly the same mean payoff as in the
model without second-order punishment. Thus, in contrast to the
case of diminishing taxes, second-order punishment is effective to
eradicate tax evasion, but it does not lead to any improvement of
the average payoffs. If the two mechanisms can be combined,
however, the mean payoff becomes π^ ¼ rccγ=n (or, with our
parameter values, π^ ¼ 1:86), which converges to the social opti-
mum rc-c for large groups.
4.3. Incomplete information
The previous ﬁndings can be considered as a proof of principle,
showing that public punishment institutions can facilitate the
evolution of pool punishment. To this end, we have assumed that
once a punishment institution is established, its existence imme-
diately becomes common knowledge, and all individuals have the
chance to adapt their behaviors correspondingly. Let us now
investigate the consequences of incomplete information: instead
of assuming that all players are informed about the existence of a
punishment institution, we now assume that only a fraction λ of
individuals knows about the institution's existence (with
0rλr1). Moreover, let us suppose that the players' information
does not depend on their strategy, and that opportunists cooperate
if they know that a punishment institution has been established
and defect otherwise. In that case, the expected payoffs need to be
modiﬁed as follows:
πD ¼
NL
n1
 
N1n1 sþ 1
NL
n1
 
N1
n1
 
0
BBB@
1
CCCA rcNCþNPþλNONNL1 β
 
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NNP1
n1
 
 NL
n1
 
N1
n1
  rc λNO
NNLNP1
β
 
πC ¼
NL
n1
 
N1
n1
 sþ 1
NL
n1
 
N1
n1
 
0
BBB@
1
CCCA rcNCþNPþλNO1NNL1 c
 

NNP1
n1
 
 NL
n1
 
N1
n1
  rc λNO
NNLNP1
πP ¼
NL
n1
 
N1
n1
 sþ 1
NL
n1
 
N1
n1
 
0
BBB@
1
CCCA rcNCþNPþλNO1NNL1 cγ
 
πO ¼
NL
n1
 
N1
n1
 sþ 1
NL
n1
 
N1
n1
 
0
BBB@
1
CCCA rcNCþNPþλðNO1ÞNNL1 λcð1λÞβ
 

NNP1
n1
 
 NL
n1
 
N1
n1
  rc λðNO1Þ
NNLNP1
λcð1λÞβ
 
;
ð10Þ
with the payoff for loners being unchanged, πL ¼ s. Using the large
population approximation as before, we can calculate the mixed
equilibrium between opportunists and pool punishers. We ﬁnd
that this equilibrium only exists if the information level λ is above
a critical threshold, λ1 ¼ ðcþγÞ=rc, in which case the equilibrium
fraction of opportunists is given by
x^O ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
γð1λÞðβcÞ
λðrccÞð1λÞβ
n 1
s
: ð11Þ
As expected, this fraction coincides with expression (4) in the case
of full information, λ¼1. The equilibrium is stable if equilibrium
payoffs exceed the payoffs of loners and cooperators (which will
always be the case if λ approaches 1); the corresponding threshold
λ2 can be obtained numerically. Fig. 5 gives an illustration of these
ﬁndings: public institutions do only promote pool punishment if
they are sufﬁciently public. For the parameters shown here,
roughly three quarters of the population need to be informed
about the institution's existence. Interestingly, however, the payoff
formulas in (10) indicate that all players beneﬁt from a high
information level – as all payoffs are monotonically increasing in λ.
Intuitively, tax payers want the institution to be publicly visible as
this increases the cooperation rate within their group, whereas
opportunists beneﬁt from public information because it helps
them to avoid punishment.
4.4. Institutions with a linear punishment technology
In the previous models we have modeled the institution's
punishment technology as a volunteer's dilemma: a single tax
payer is sufﬁcient to set up an effective punishment institution.
This allowed a minority of tax payers to invade a population of
opportunists, by successfully swaying them to cooperate. However,
especially in large groups it will typically take a larger number of
tax payers to create a reliable punishment regime. Does this
prohibit the emergence of public sanctioning institutions?
To investigate this question, we have explored sanctioning
institutions with a linear punishment technology, as in Sigmund
et al. (2010, 2011): if k is the number of tax payers within a group,
then free riders are punished by an amount βk. This model reﬂects
a situation in which tax payers contribute an amount γk into a
punishment pool which is then used to detect and sanction free
riders. When βoc, a single tax payer is no longer sufﬁcient to
deter opportunists; instead it takes a least k^ ¼ ⌈c=β⌉ tax payers to
create a sufﬁcient threat (i.e., k^ is the lowest integer such that
βk^Zc).
For Fig. 6 we have therefore run additional simulations for
which we have assumed that opportunists only cooperate if they
ﬁnd themselves in a group in which the punishment institution
is sufﬁciently powerful (i.e., if kZ k^). These simulations indicate
that stable pool punishment institutions can still evolve under
appropriate conditions. However, unlike in the previous models,
the emergence and the stability of pool punishment depend on
the exact parameters of the game. To see this, let us calculate
the equilibrium conditions for a stable coexistence between pool
punishers and opportunists in large populations. If all other
strategies are absent, the payoffs of the two strategies are given by
πOðxOÞ ¼ ∑
k^1
nP ¼ 0
n1
nP
 !
ð1xOÞnP xn1nPO
rc
n1β
 
nP
þ ∑
n1
nP ¼ k^
n1
nP
 !
ð1xOÞnP xn1nPO ðrccÞ
πPðxOÞ ¼ ∑
k^2
nP ¼ 0
n1
nP
 !
ð1xOÞnP xn1nPO
rcnP
n1cγ
 
þ ∑
n1
nP ¼ k^1
n1
nP
 !
ð1xOÞnP xn1nPO ðrccγÞ ð12Þ
The equilibrium fraction of opportunists can then be found by
solving the implicit equation:
gðxOÞ ¼ πPðxOÞπOðxOÞ ¼ 0: ð13Þ
If the population consists of pool punishers only, then gðxO ¼ 0Þ ¼
γo0. On the other hand, if the population consists of opportu-
nists only, then gðxO ¼ 1Þ ¼ cγo0 (provided that k^41). Thus,
Fig. 5. Evolutionary dynamics under incomplete information. Each point shows the
abundance of the respective strategy in simulations for various information levels λ.
Public sanctioning institutions only promote the evolution of pool punishment if
players have a sufﬁcient knowledge about the institution's existence. The equili-
brium between pool punishers and opportunists (depicted by lines) exists if
λ exceeds the threshold λ1 ¼ ðcþγÞ=rc, and it is stable if λ4λ2 (where the
equilibrium payoff exceeds the loner's payoff). Once the equilibrium is stable, it
accurately describes the outcome of the simulation (parameters: N¼100, n¼5,
c¼1, r¼3, γ¼0.7, β¼1.5, s¼0.5 and μ¼0.001).
S. Schoenmakers et al. / Journal of Theoretical Biology 356 (2014) 36–4642
opportunists gain higher payoffs at both boundaries, and the
existence of an interior equilibrium is no longer guaranteed.
Nevertheless, depending on the parameters of the game, a
stable interior equilibrium may still exist, as in the case of Fig. 6.
In that case, it follows as before that this equilibrium is globally
stable if players have the option to abstain from the public good.
Surprisingly, this equilibrium may even be attained if loners are
removed from the strategy set (as depicted in Fig. 6B). In that case,
the dynamics is bistable: populations either move towards a
mixture of opportunists and defectors, or towards a mixture of
opportunists and pool punishers. Which of these equilibria is
eventually chosen depends on the respective basins of attraction,
and therefore on the game parameters. In general, stable punish-
ment institutions are most likely to evolve if the punishment
technology is efﬁcient (i.e., if β/γ is sufﬁciently high), and if
abstaining from the public good is not too proﬁtable (i.e., if s is
sufﬁciently low), as depicted in Fig. 6C.
In a similar way, one can also study sanctioning institutions
where the punishment ﬁne additionally depends on the number of
free riders in a group (such that the funds in the punishment pool
βk are divided by the number of free riders that are to be punished).
Such a model would yield similar qualitative conclusions: again, it
depends on the exact parameters of the game whether there is an
equilibrium between pool punishers and opportunists. When there
is such an equilibrium, it is either globally stable (if players have the
option to abstain from the public good), or there is a bistable
dynamics (if participation in the game is mandatory).
5. Discussion
During the last decades, there have been tremendous efforts to
study how forms of punishment and policing can be used to uphold
cooperation (for a summary of these efforts,we refer to Sigmund,
2007). Most previous models have considered peer punishment,
assuming that cheaters are directly punished by their conspeciﬁcs
(if the interaction occurred within a species), or by the fooled
interaction partner (in mutualistic symbioses between species, as in
Bshary and Grutter, 2005; Goto et al., 2010). In some cases, such as in
humans (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003) and in the cleaner ﬁsh
mutualism (Raihani et al., 2010), it has even been observed that third
parties may engage in costly punishment. As sanctions lead to a
selective pressure against cheating, punishment can be considered as
a theoretical solution for the problem of cooperation. This solution,
however, opens up a series of new problems:What is the evolutionary
advantage of engaging in punishment in the ﬁrst place (Colman,
2006)? Why would unrelated third parties engage in punishment
(Roos et al., 2014)? When is punishment used responsibly to punish
cheaters only, and when is it misused for antisocial punishment or
spiteful punishment (Hilbe and Traulsen, 2012)? These problems have
led to the conclusion that peer punishment may be mainly used to
establish dominance hierarchies, instead of maintaining mutual
cooperation (Dreber et al., 2008).
Humans have found a rather unique way to circumvent some of
these problems. Instead of relying on decentralized sanctioning
mechanisms, many human societies have implemented norms and
institutions to maintain cooperation (and conversely, some of the
most pressing problems, such as the prevention of dangerous climate
change, are still unsolved because of a lack of proper institutions on
the global scale). The emergence and the stability of such institutions
can be studied using evolutionary game theory, and the correspond-
ing models, such as the model herein, share many features with
models for the evolution of peer punishment (see also the models of
Sigmund et al., 2010, 2011; Sasaki et al., 2012; Perc, 2012). However,
there is an important difference between peer punishment and pool
punishment: the costs of peer punishment are paid after cheating
has taken place, whereas the costs of setting up a pool punishment
institution need to be paid beforehand. Contributions to punishment
institutions can therefore additionally act as a costly signal, which
can be used to affect the behaviors of others. The signals in our model
are not meant to confer information about individual quality, as in
models of partner choice (e.g. Zahavi, 1975; Grafen, 1990; Han et al.,
2013). Instead, these signals communicate that cheating will be
unproﬁtable. Police stations, located in the middle of a town, do
not only help to sanction rule-breakers; they prevent individuals
from breaking the rules in the ﬁrst place. Given this signaling effect of
punishment institutions, it becomes in turn quite natural to locate
police stations at publicly visible places.
Our model provides a link between evolutionary game theory
and the literature on the economics of crime which interprets
crime as a consequence of rational reasoning (e.g., Becker, 1968).
According to this latter view, people only commit crime if the
expected beneﬁt exceeds the associated risks. This requires indi-
viduals to take into account all available signs that allow them to
assess the prospects of cheating. In principle, a vast number of
direct and indirect signs may be available for such an assessment.
It has been argued that already a building with a broken window,
which is left unrepaired, could act as such a signal (Wilson and
Fig. 6. Evolution of stable institutions for a linear punishment regime. The panels (A) and (B) show the outcome of simulations (dots) together with the analytical prediction
according to the stable equilibrium arising from Eq. (13) (lines). For the parameters used here, we recover the result that public institutions allow the emergence of stable
pool punishment in the limit of strong selection. In general, such a result can be expected if the punishment technology is sufﬁciently efﬁcient, and if abstaining from the
public good is not too proﬁtable, as depicted in panel (C) (parameters: N¼100, n¼10, c¼1, r¼3, γ¼0.3, β¼0.6, s¼0.5 and μ¼0.001).
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Kelling, 1982; Keizer et al., 2008). The opportunists in our model
employ a rudimentary form of this kind of reasoning – they are
cooperative in a community that has established an effective
sanctioning system, and they start cheating when such a system
is absent. As our results suggest, such opportunistic behavior
evolves quite naturally when sanctioning institutions act as a
public signal. Interestingly, however, it is exactly the emergence of
such opportunistic behavior that promotes the evolution of public
punishment institutions and eventually stabilizes them.
As we have shown, neither the option to abstain nor second-
order punishment is necessary for pool punishment to evolve if
the signaling effect is present. This does not imply that second-
order punishment is needless (in fact, in most societies tax evasion
is illegal and not tolerated). Instead, we have shown that second-
order punishment can be an effective means to reduce tax evasion,
and to establish a fair division of the costs for a punishment
institution (under the realistic assumption that individual taxes
decrease with the number of tax payers). In many experiments, a
fair division of institutional costs seems to be an important issue;
subjects are unwilling to implement individually beneﬁcial insti-
tutions if this would lead to unfair outcomes (e.g., Kosfeld et al.,
2009). Effective institutions are therefore likely to require a mix of
different mechanisms; they may employ second-order punish-
ment to induce fair outcomes, and they may rely on the signaling
effect to reduce the temptation to free ride.
Some explanations for the evolution of peer punishment are based
on a similar signaling effect: subjects may punish others in order to
establish a strict reputation, which may help them in future encounters
(Sigmund et al., 2001; dos Santos et al., 2011; Hilbe and Traulsen, 2012;
dos Santos et al., 2013). Reputation is an important driving force for
cooperation (Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001; Milinski et al., 2002;
Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004; Nowak and Sigmund, 2005; Bateson et al.,
2006). With our model, we have aimed to extend the concept of
reputation to institutions: central authorities like the police have a strict
reputation by their very nature, which in turn may prevent community
members from cheating. This may be especially relevant in anonymous
communities: even if groups are too large to know the reputation of all
communitymembers, it seems fairly easy to communicate the existence
of a central punishment institution. Thus, we speculate that this
signaling effect may also be an important reason for the transition
from decentralized peer punishment to centralized pool punishment.
We stress that signaling the willingness to punish others per se
is not advantageous (Hilbe and Traulsen, 2012): in the case of peer
punishment, only responsible punishment behavior targeted at
free-riders can emerge based on opportunism, but not bullying or
spite. A peer punishment system, however, has the disadvantage
that it is based on threats that may be mere cheap talk. But in the
case of centralized sanctions, where the institution has to be
supported before the public goods interaction takes place, an
honest signal can help cooperation to emerge and to prevail.
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Appendix A. Derivation of payoffs
Herein, we derive the payoffs πi for the four strategies
iAfD;C; P;Og according to Eq. (1). Suppose the focal player inter-
acts with nL loners, nD defectors, nC cooperators, nP pool punishers,
and nO opportunists, such that
nLþnDþnCþnPþnO ¼ n1: ðA:1Þ
We need to distinguish three possible cases:
1. All other group members are loners (nL ¼ n 1); in that case the
focal player becomes a loner automatically, yielding the payoff s.
2. The group contains at least one other member that participates
in the public goods game, but the group fails to establish a
punishment institution (nLrn2, nP¼0, and the focal player is
not a pool punisher); in that case only cooperators contribute
to the public good.
3. The group contains at least one other member that participates,
and a punishment institution is established (nLrn2, and
either the focal player is a punisher, or nP40); in that case
cooperators, opportunists, and pool punishers contribute to the
public good, and defectors are punished.
As groups are formed by randomly drawing n1 co-players from
the population, this distinction leads to the following formula for
the expected payoff of a defector,
πD ¼
NL
n1
 
N1
n1
   sþ ∑
nL r n 2
nP ¼ 0
NL
nL
 !
ND1
nD
 !
NC
nC
 !
NP
nP
 !
NO
nO
 !
N1
n1
  rc  nC
nnL1
þ ∑
nL r n 2;
nP 4 0
NL
nL
 !
ND1
nD
 !
NC
nC
 !
NP
nP
 !
NO
nO
 !
N1
n1
  rc  ðnCþnOþnPÞ
nnL1
β
 
;
ðA:2Þ
where the sum is taken over all possible group compositions
nL; nD; nC ; nP ; nO subject to condition (A.1). Similarly, the
expected payoffs of the other strategies are given by
πC ¼
NL
n1
 
N1
n1
   s
þ ∑
nL r n 2
nP ¼ 0
NL
nL
 !
ND
nD
 !
NC1
nC
 !
NP
nP
 !
NO
nO
 !
N1
n1
  rc  nC
nnL1
c
 
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nL r n 2;
nP 4 0
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N1
n1
  rc  ðnCþnOþnPÞ
nnL1
c
 
;
ðA:3Þ
πP ¼
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 
N1
n1
   s
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nL
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cγ
 
;
ðA:4Þ
and
πO ¼
NL
n1
 
N1
n1
   s
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þ ∑
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NO1
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N1
n1
  rc  nC
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NO1nO
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n1
  rc  ðnCþnOþnPÞ
nnL1
c
 
:
ðA:5Þ
Using the properties of multinomial distributions, one can simplify
these expressions. A somewhat laborious computation conﬁrms
that the payoffs can be written as in Eq. (1). For a more detailed
derivation, we refer to Schoenmakers (2013).
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